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Abstract: This study offers a detailed analysis of an under-researched social problem
of in-situ marginalisation and its causes by drawing on the concept of state
entrepreneurialism. Our empirical data stem from the Lingang mega project in Shanghai
and one of its neighbourhoods named Neighbourhood No.57 where we ﬁnd that the
residents have not been relocated but are instead suffering from declining public ser-
vices and environmental quality from surrounding industrial developments. The root
cause of this problem is the municipal government’s prioritisation of its strategic objec-
tives of economic development over the livelihood of local residents. The strategic vision
of the municipality has led to mass relocation in its early phases of development but in
its later stages leaves many residents waiting for relocation whilst being gradually sur-
rounded by industrial developments. Despite continued residential complaints and peti-
tions, in-situ marginalisation is not resolved due to the institutional arrangement of
Lingang, which has centralised planning and ﬁnancing powers to newly created project-
oriented state organisation. Social responsibilities have been relegated to lower-tiered
governments in Lingang which have neither planning power nor the ﬁnancial resources
to resolve the problems of residents. By examining the case of Lingang, this paper pro-
vides a different analytical framework for explaining the social problems emerging from
China’s mega urban developments.
Abstract: 本文运用 “国家企业家主义” (state entrepreneurialism) 的概念分析 “就地边
缘化” (in-situ marginalisation) 的社会问题。 案例来自于上海临港新城内的某社区。该社
区的居民没有因为重大项目而动迁，但面临公共设施不足，受到由周边工业开发所引起的
环境污染问题的影响。就地边缘化问题是由于市政府着重于经济发展战略。为达成战略目
标，开发项目的管理制度将经济发展和规划权利转移到侧重负责开发的管委会和国企开发
公司，而将社会管理下放给缺乏经济能力的镇政府。由于这样侧重于经济的战略开发和相
应的管理模式，这些与重大项目关系不大的社区居民就出现了就地边缘化。通过此案例，
本文提供了一个与西方理论不同的框架来诠释中国重大项目开发所导致的社会问题。
Keywords: in-situ marginalisation, mega urban projects, state entrepreneurialism,
resident relocation, project-oriented governance
Introduction
There is growing scholarship that examines the social impacts of large-scale urban
projects on local communities (Fainstein 2008; Hiller 1998; Lehrer and Laidley
2008; Olds 1998; Orueta and Fainstein 2008). Being referred to as the “conduits
of neoliberal governance” (Tarazona Vento 2017:70), mega urban projects espe-
cially in the global North have been used as empirical evidence to showcase the
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detrimental social effects of neoliberal urban politics. Many studies have associ-
ated the project-led approach of mega urban development with the displacement
of marginalised residents, the gradual gentriﬁcation of localities and the emer-
gence of a post-political society (Attuyer 2015; Lehrer and Laidley 2008; Olds
1998; Swyngedouw 2009; Swyngedouw et al. 2002; Tarazona Vento 2017; Watt
2013). Large-scale developments have also become a salient feature of Chinese
urbanisation and many studies have highlighted the social problems such projects
create (Jiang et al. 2018; Shin 2012; Wu et al. 2013; Zhang 2004). Most of the
critique so far has been directed towards the process of mass relocating residents
and its ensuing problems of forced displacements and conﬂicts over poor com-
pensation (Hsing 2010; Shih 2010; Shin 2012; Zhang 2004). However, some
recent studies argue that Chinese mega projects not only affect those who have
been relocated but also negatively affect residents who remain grounded in their
original residence (He et al. 2009; Shih 2017; Siu 2007). We use the term of in-
situ marginalisation (Shih 2017:394) to describe the problems experienced by resi-
dents who have not been relocated but instead suffer from a decline of their
neighbourhood, social isolation and environmental pollution due to Chinese
mega projects.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the problem of in-situ marginalisation as
a major social impact of Chinese mega projects and its underlying causes. Our
paper draws on the ﬁndings from Lingang new town, which is part of a growing
number of peri-urban mega projects that have been developed in recent decades
(Hsing 2010; Shen and Wu 2017; Wu and Phelps 2011). We contend that the
theoretical framework of neoliberalisation whereby mega projects mainly serve to
garner ﬁnancial proﬁts through land revalorisation (Brenner and Theodore 2002;
Swyngedouw et al. 2002; Tarazona Vento 2017) cannot explain the social prob-
lems found in Lingang. Instead, we contend that the concept of “state
entrepreneurialism”, which emphasises the role of mega projects as a means to
realise the state’s strategic and political objectives (Wu 2018; Wu and Phelps
2011), has greater purchase in understanding what has led to the under-re-
searched phenomenon of in-situ marginalisation in China.
The Social Impact of Mega Urban Projects
The proliferation of mega urban projects in the last few decades has resulted in
worsening social inequality and the decline of the democratic decision-making
process (Attuyer 2015; Hiller 2000; Lehrer and Laidley 2008; Olds 1998; Orueta
and Fainstein 2008; Tarazona Vento 2017). The emergence and social impacts of
mega projects are often attributed to the neoliberalisation of urban governance
and entrepreneurial local states, which prioritise economic gain through land
revalorisation over social objectives (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Lehrer and Laid-
ley 2008; Orueta and Fainstein 2008; Swyngedouw et al. 2002). Explicit goals to
proﬁt from the increased land prices and to improve the tax basis (Swyngedouw
et al. 2002) mean that the most vulnerable groups such as tenants without any
formal rental contracts are the ﬁrst to be displaced (Olds 1998). In the long term,
such economic objectives lead to the gentriﬁcation of its surrounding areas (Watt
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2013). Moreover, the reliance on the private sector and the increasingly more pri-
vate-led governance of mega projects have resulted in the decline of public par-
ticipation in the development of mega projects (Haila 2008; Lehrer and Laidley
2008; Tarazona Vento 2017). Formal participation processes only allow residents
to discuss superﬁcial concerns such as technical details of developments whilst
avoiding substantial issues including the necessity of developing mega projects or
the way such projects should be delivered (Attuyer 2015; Fainstein 2008; Lehrer
and Laidley 2008). Consequently, interests of local residents and the wider public
are often side-lined for the sake of creating ﬁnancial proﬁts for the growth coali-
tion.
Whilst the dominant discourse on mega projects is mostly based on empirical
studies from the global North, mega projects have also proliferated in Asian coun-
tries (Shatkin 2017; Sonn et al. 2017) whereby China has emerged as a hotbed
for large-scale urban projects (Jiang et al. 2016a; Li and Chiu 2018; Shen and Wu
2017; Wu and Waley 2018). However, increasingly more studies express doubt
that the concept of neoliberalisation is suited to explain the Chinese urban devel-
opment process (Wu 2018; Wu and Phelps 2011). In China, large-scale displace-
ment and forced evictions from mega developments such as the Shanghai Expo
or the Beijing 2008 Olympic games continue to be of great concern (Shin 2012;
Zhang 2017). Land expropriation has displaced millions of residents in order to
make space for new developments (Shin 2012; Wu et al. 2013). Large numbers
of forced evictions and poor compensation schemes have also led to severe con-
ﬂicts between residents and the state (Shih 2010; Zhang 2004). Following large
numbers of complaints from residents, the state has improved and standardised
its compensation scheme, especially in large cities such as Shanghai (Shih 2010).
However, problems continue to exist as relocated residents are still uprooted from
their former neighbourhoods because compensation properties are located in
remote areas with poorly serviced infrastructure (Zhang et al. 2018). Due to high
property prices in the inner cities and insufﬁcient monetary compensation, dis-
placed residents are unable to buy another property in the same area. In recent
years, the proliferation of mega projects in peri-urban areas in the form of new
towns, industrial development zones or science parks (Hsing 2010; Shen and Wu
2017; Wu and Phelps 2011) has also led to the relocation of many residents living
in urban peripheries. However, the experience of relocation in peri-urban areas
has been more mixed. Studies found both negative experiences of displacement
and residents complaining about the lack of employment (Jiang et al. 2018) and
more positive responses about improved living standards (Li and Song 2009).
Hsing’s (2010) research in rural Beijing revealed that the government is much
keener to develop in the rural areas of cities. Firstly, the amount of land acquired
for the same amount of money in rural areas is much higher than in the inner city
and also because ofﬁcials think “it is easier to deal with peasants than urbanites”
(Hsing 2010:93). Often the resistance of villagers is considerably weaker as their
demand for compensation is lower and therefore easier to satisfy (Hsing 2010;
Shih 2017). Furthermore, the conversion of farmland to urban land has also taken
away the source of living for landless farmers who instead have to rely on renting
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out properties to migrants and take on other jobs in cases where the rental
income is not sufﬁcient (He et al. 2009; Jiang et al. 2018).
Beyond Physical Displacement: In-Situ Marginalisation
in China
Another considerably less documented but equally severe social problem is the
phenomenon of in-situ marginalisation. In this study, we broadly deﬁne in-situ
marginalisation as a process whereby residents are not being physically uprooted
by urban (re)development but instead experience a gradual decline of their physi-
cal and social living environment over time. Residents are trapped within this
worsening environment and lack the ability to halt the decline themselves. In-situ
marginalisation can take on many different forms of decline ranging from environ-
mental pollution to declining physical environments. Unlike physical displace-
ment, processes of in-situ marginalisation are often (but does not always have to
be) hidden from the public eye and less visible by nature. The process can occur
both in peri-urban areas (Shih 2017) and inner cities such as in Shanghai’s physi-
cally deprived urban villages which are subjected to strict building regulations that
prevent homeowners from improving their housing quality (Wu 2016). In peri-ur-
ban areas, in-situ marginalisation often involves residents being surrounded by
industrial developments and exposure to pollution as well as isolation from other
parts of the area and the new development itself. Research in different Chinese
cities shows that large-scale urban expansion projects have not led to mass-reloca-
tion of rural villagers (He et al. 2009; Shih 2017; Siu 2007). Instead rural residents
were allowed to stay in their original village, although their farmland had been
expropriated by the state for industrial development. Having lost their stable
income through farming, residents had to rely on other more unreliable sources
of income such as renting out properties to migrants or working on low-paid
menial jobs such as collecting trash (He et al. 2009; Shih 2017). Shih (2017) ﬁnds
that some villages were gradually surrounded by industrial developments which
adversely affected residents’ health over time. Our study argues that the cause of
in-situ marginalisation is strongly associated with China’s urban governance
approach, which Wu (2018) describes as state entrepreneurialism. The next sec-
tion provides a deﬁnition of state entrepreneurialism and explains how it has pro-
duced in-situ marginalisation.
Conceptualising State Entrepreneurialism and In-Situ
Marginalisation
An increasing number of studies have highlighted the dominant role of the state
in deﬁning China’s urban governance (Jiang et al. 2016b; Li and Chiu 2018;
Shatkin 2017; Wu 2018). Drawing on the concept of “state entrepreneurialism”,
Wu (2018:1385) argues that China’s “local development and politics may not be
limited to the growth machine and machine politics”. Whilst in the US and Eur-
ope, private corporations dominate urban developments (Fainstein 2008; Lehrer
and Laidley 2008; Swyngedouw et al. 2002), in China it is the state and in
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particular municipal level governments that introduce, develop and deploy “mar-
ket instruments and engages in market-like entrepreneurial activities” (Wu
2018:1384). The state gives its “ofﬁcials, usually at the local level within a deﬁned
jurisdiction territory, the power and capacities to conduct economic development,
for the prospect of their political career and economic growth. Consequently, the
state is transformed into an entrepreneurial market agency—known as ‘state
entrepreneurialism’” (Wu 2017:160). Despite the commodiﬁcation in China, the
market therefore does not dominate or weaken the state but instead helps to fur-
ther consolidate the state’s power. Mega projects initiated by lower levels of gov-
ernment such as district governments tend to have proﬁt-oriented goals such as
land value capture through land sales (Li and Chiu 2018; Wu and Waley 2018).
On the other hand, many mega projects especially initiated by municipal, regional
or even national level governments (for example Xiong’An New Area) have more
strategic objectives such as restructuring the industrial sector, alignment with cen-
tral government policies (Wu 2018:1385) and competing with neighbouring cities
(Jiang et al. 2016a). Although the speciﬁc objectives of Chinese mega projects
may vary, they tend to focus on uplifting the economy and ultimately serve to
consolidate the state’s power. For instance, the Shanghai Hongqiao project aims
to become the new CBD in the Yangtze River Delta region and to stimulate the
economy of Shanghai’s underdeveloped peri-urban districts (Jiang et al. 2016a).
With regards to how in-situ marginalisation in peri-urban areas is associated
with state entrepreneurialism, we contend that the root cause lies with the state’s
prioritisation of its own political and economic objectives over the social aspects
of urban developments. This is reﬂected in the way Chinese mega projects are
developed, whereby the state makes use of three key mechanisms to realise its
strategic objectives, which in turn have resulted in in-situ marginalisation.
Land Development Model. In China the state has to rely on its monopoly over
land to initiate and ﬁnance large-scale developments (Chung et al. 2018; Hsing
2010; Wu 2018) and tends to involve the following process. The state would use
land as collateral to borrow money from state-owned banks and then use the
loan to ﬁrstly relocate rural residents and acquire land for the construction of
industrial developments and basic infrastructure such as roads (Chung et al.
2018). The land value of industrial development and infrastructure is considerably
lower than residential developments, yet the local state has to build them ﬁrst in
order to attract businesses to move to the area which in turn would generate
more residential and commercial demand. At the early stage of the development,
the state does not actually make any proﬁt and would have to rely on the subse-
quent sale of land for residential and commercial developments to make a proﬁt.
Industrial developments and especially basic infrastructure require a vast amount
of land (Hsing 2010) and to ensure the future supply of such land in case
demand increases, local governments would often designate large areas as indus-
trial zones. Yet, in practice, despite being designated as industrial zones, it would
often take years for it to be fully developed. To save expenses, not all local resi-
dents are relocated at once and many would remain grounded, particularly those
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which are hard or expensive to relocate (Shih 2017). The remaining residents will
be relocated if demand for industrial development picks up, but since this could
take years and is dependent on the success of the project, many residents are
stuck in limbo until then whilst their surrounding is gradually being redeveloped
for industrial uses.
Relevance of Resident Groups to the State’s Strategic Objectives. Chinese mega
projects under state entrepreneurialism serve to realise objectives for capital accu-
mulation and consolidation of political power and are not welfare projects that
extend public services to its population (Wu 2018:1392). Chinese mega projects
thus differ from more socially progressive and state-led mega projects such as the
British new towns developed in the 1960s, which focused on providing affordable
housing and social mix (Forsyth 2019). The amount of beneﬁt and degree of care
the Chinese state extends to its residents depend on how relevant residents are
for the realisation of the state’s strategic objectives. If native residents live in areas
that are vital for developing the mega project, the state will provide generous
compensation packages in order to convince residents to move away as soon as
possible. The increasingly more generous compensation towards residents (Shih
2010) is therefore selective and more an attempt to foreground resistance instead
of pure benevolence of the state (Kan 2019). However, once the “obstacle” of
residents has been relocated from the site, the state also halts its care for the relo-
cated residents as can be seen from the lack of employment and community facil-
ities for relocated residents (Jiang et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018). Another
resident group that is of great relevance to the strategic objectives of the state
are prospective new residents with high levels of education and technical skills.
For instance, this can be observed from the Chinese government’s recent strategic
vision to foster indigenous science innovation, which has resulted in a large num-
ber of new science parks (Miao 2017; Miao and Hall 2014; Zhang and Wu 2012).
Although some cities used science parks as a guise to generate land revenue
(Miao 2017; Miao and Hall 2014), one core objective for such science parks is to
attract researchers and other highly skilled residents to move to the science park.
Considered as a highly successful science park by the national government,
Zhangjiang Science Park in Pudong offers a series of beneﬁts, including start up
grants, tax relief and subsidised housing to high-skilled people to move to Zhang-
jiang (Zhang 2015).
In contrast, resident groups that are not vital to the realisation of the state’s
vision receive little beneﬁt from the development project. This includes residents
who are neither located in areas vital for the realisation of the mega project nor
occupy an amount of land that is critical for the delivery of industrial develop-
ments. Such resident groups do not receive any form of compensation or offers
of relocation. Under such circumstances, rural villages closer to the city centre
and surrounded by developments such as residential areas and commercial prop-
erties tend to become urban villages where their residents have lost their land
and instead have to rely on renting out their properties to rural migrants (He
et al. 2009; Shih 2017). In comparison, rural villages in more remote areas that
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have lost their farmland and are located in industrial zones experience in-situ
marginalisation, including problems of environmental pollution from nearby facto-
ries and decline of amenities and basic infrastructure.
Project-Oriented Governance and Devolvement of Social Responsibilities. The
state’s land development model and its differentiated treatment towards different
resident groups explain the emergence of in-situ marginalisation as a spatial and
social phenomenon. However, the question remains as to why the state has not
responded to this problem for so long despite serious resident complaints and
public petitions (Shih 2017). To answer this question, it is necessary to consider
the speciﬁc institutional arrangement that was put in place to govern Chinese
mega projects. To ensure that the development outcomes of the project align
with the strategic objectives of the state, at the city level, the government usually
adds two types of “special-purpose and project-oriented” state organisations to
the existing institutional hierarchy of the mega project (Jiang et al. 2016a:1937).
The ﬁrst type of state organisation takes the form of a State Owned Development
Corporation (henceforth SODC),1 which is essentially a state-owned enterprise
specialised in urban development. Akin to private developers, SODCs are in
charge of funding and delivering speciﬁc development projects (Jiang and Waley
2018). SODCs are given the power of primary land development and allowed to
use land as collateral to acquire loans from state-owned banks (Li and Chiu
2018). Proﬁts generated from development and land conveyance fees are also
collected by SODCs. In practice, the SODC is the key mechanism to carry out the
“land ﬁnance” model and to allow the state to ﬁnance large infrastructure pro-
jects through land value capture (Li and Chiu 2018). The second type of state
organisation takes on quasi-governmental responsibilities, including the creation
of the masterplan and development policies as well as approving planning appli-
cations (Jiang et al. 2016b; Wu and Phelps 2011). In recent years, this type of
organisation is often called the “management committee” (guanli weiyuanhui or
guanweihui in short). The key reason why the management committee cannot be
considered as a fully ﬂedged government is because in many cases it does not
need to take on any responsibilities of governing local residents (Jiang et al.
2016b). The responsibility of governing local residents is devolved to the existing
district and sub-district government who are in charge of delivering services such
as waste management, policing, social service and health care. The district and
subdistrict governments are also responsible for relocating residents. The division
of labour between the project-oriented state organisations and the existing local
governments is very clear and does not overlap a lot, although in the case of relo-
cating residents there is some degree of collaboration. Usually, the SODC is
responsible for funding the compensation of relocated residents whilst the sub-
district government is charged with the “dirty work” of actually relocating resi-
dents (Jiang et al. 2016b:33).
Under this institutional arrangement, SODCs and the management committees
are free of any social responsibilities towards residents and are not held account-
able by the municipality for any complaints by residents. The state’s response to
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the contestation arising from dissatisﬁed residents is to devolve its social responsi-
bilities to lower levels of governments. However, this centralisation of planning
and economic power to state organisations directly administered by the munici-
pality coupled with the devolvement of social responsibilities to lower tier govern-
ments is problematic. Under this model, district and sub-district governments,
which are much more aware of the local context, do not have any planning
power themselves and cannot pre-empt problems of in-situ marginalisation by for
instance incorporating residents’ needs into the masterplan of mega projects. Fur-
thermore, district and sub-district governments do not receive direct ﬁnancial
beneﬁts from the mega project, which sometimes lead to tensions between the
district government and the project-oriented state organisations (Jiang et al.
2016b). Under this model, lower-tiered governments in charge of residents are
therefore in no position to compensate or relocate residents suffering from in-situ
marginalisation by themselves.
Research Methodology
This paper draws on the case of Lingang New Town in Shanghai and one of its
neighbourhoods called Neighbourhood No.57 to illustrate the causal relationship
between China’s state entrepreneurial governance and the social problem of in-
situ marginalisation. One key objective for the research on Lingang was to under-
stand the underlying motivation for developing this mega urban project, how it
was governed and its social impacts on local residents. This required a qualitative
methodological approach that involved ﬁve ﬁeldtrips to Lingang between
September 2015 and November 2017. Research methods include ethnographic
ﬁeld observations, document analysis, attending organised events by the Lingang
authorities and 51 semi-structured interviews. Interviewees included residents,
planners, government ofﬁcials at the municipal, district and township level, pri-
vate developers and international ﬁrms and lasted between 30 minutes and two
hours. To research the social impact of Lingang New Town, we draw on a range
of ofﬁcial and internal reports and other written materials, including the ofﬁcial
masterplan for Lingang, all versions of Lingang’s governance policies, internal
population and development reports as well as current special policies for the
development of Lingang. We also conducted semi-structured interviews with a
total of 16 residents, including residents who have been relocated and those who
are still living in their original homes. With regards to residents who have not
been relocated, this study mainly draws on the case of Neighbourhood No.57 (a
pseudonym), where we interviewed seven residents including native residents,
migrant residents, one landlord and a staff member of the residential association.
The research team visited Neighbourhood No.57 ﬁve times between June 2016
and November 2017 and also collected other forms of qualitative materials,
including ﬁeld observations, informal visits to the factories surrounding the neigh-
bourhood, photos of the surrounding neighbourhood as well as informal conver-
sations with other local residents. In addition, we conducted interviews with a
range of state organisations involved in Lingang and Neighbourhood No.57,
including government ofﬁcials working at the municipal level, former staff
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members of the Nanhui district and current ofﬁcials of the Pudong district gov-
ernment as well as planners working in Lingang’s township governments. In addi-
tion, we interviewed senior ofﬁcials of the Lingang Development Management
Committee (henceforth LDMC) and seven SODCs operating in Lingang as well as
senior staff of two major private development companies which have invested in
Lingang.
Lingang New Town and In-Situ Marginalisation in
Neighbourhood No.57
Lingang new town was initiated in 2002 as part of Shanghai’s masterplan to
develop nine new towns in the suburban and peri-urban areas of the city (see
Figure 1 for its location). Lingang covers an area of 315 km2 and includes one
new main residential town as well as four industrial zones (see Figure 2 for Lin-
gang’s land-use map). The main residential town of Lingang is called Nanhui
main town and comprises an area of 67.76 km2, which has been entirely
reclaimed from the sea. Apart from the main town, Lingang also has four indus-
trial zones with a combined size of 241 km2, including the main industrial zone,
the heavy-equipment manufacturing zone, Fengxian industrial zone and the com-
prehensive zone. So far, the most built-up area is the heavy-equipment manufac-
turing zone developed by the SODC called Lingang Group, whilst the remaining
industrial zones are still largely undeveloped. Lingang new town is currently gov-
erned by the LDMC, which is a state organisation directly governed by the
Shanghai municipality.
Figure 1: Lingang’s location in Shanghai
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Interviews with senior ofﬁcials of the LDMC and Lingang’s SODCs reveal that
currently the biggest challenge for them comes from residents who have not
been displaced but are requesting to be relocated, as well as the Lingang authori-
ties’ inability to accommodate these requests (Interviews with LDMC and Lingang
Group ofﬁcials, May and June 2016). Interviews reveal that many residents have
resorted to large-scale public petitions in front of the Lingang authority buildings
and even surrounded factories within the Lingang industrial zone in order to
request their relocation (Interviews with Lingang Group and Lingang residents,
August 2016). Local ofﬁcials argue that whilst poor housing conditions and over-
crowding are major reasons, there are also many residents seeking to capitalise
on the development and to trade their rural houses, which cannot be resold, for
relocation properties2 that can be either rented out or sold at market value (Inter-
views with LDMC, township government ofﬁcials, November 2016). However,
another key reason seldom mentioned by government ofﬁcials is the fact that
there are still residents in the industrial zone who have not been relocated and
are living in neighbourhoods located in close proximity to heavy industrial facto-
ries. One ongoing case of relocation dispute is Neighbourhood No.57, which is
located in one of Lingang’s industrial development zones with around 2000
households currently. Neighbourhood No.57 was built to serve as the residential
neighbourhood for a state-owned farm which opened in the early 1970s and con-
sisted of work-unit housing3 for the staff members working in the state-owned
farm. The state-owned farm itself covered an area of around 9.4 km2, which apart
from Neighbourhood No.57 consisted mainly of agricultural land use and focused
on the production of fruits and vegetables amongst others. The farm experienced
some of its busiest times during the late 1970s and 1980s, when more than 8000
Figure 2: Land use map of Lingang [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
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farmers worked and lived in Neighbourhood No.57. In the early 1990s, due to
growing ﬁnancial losses, the state-owned farm was privatised and sold to a major
private Chinese food and beverage manufacturing corporation. It was also during
this time that the work-unit housing was privatised and sold to its occupants at a
discounted rate (Interview with resident B, Neighbourhood No.57, August 2016).
Agricultural activities ofﬁcially ceased when the Lingang New Town project was
launched 2002 and all agricultural land was sold by the corporation to Lingang’s
SODC in charge of the newly established industrial zone (Interview with resident
A, Neighbourhood No.57, August 2016). Of the original 9.4 km2 large state-
owned farm, now only 80 hectares of land remain, which is the current Neigh-
bourhood No.57. Currently, the neighbourhood still has around 4000 residents,
whereby one third of residents are the original state farm staff workers who have
now retired and roughly two thirds are migrant residents who work at a nearby
harbour factory (Interview with residential committee staff, Neighbourhood
No.57, August 2016). Interviews with affected residents of Neighbourhood No.57
reveal that toxic gases are being emitted from a nearby waste incinerator centre
and a factory manufacturing containers (which involves large-scale spray paint-
ing), both located less than 2 km away from the neighbourhood. According to a
local resident, the toxic gases have resulted in rising numbers of elderly residents
suffering from respiratory diseases and cancer deaths:
The pollution here is really bad, my neighbour recently died of a lung disease and
there was another person in this neighbourhood who died of the same cause. Some
have died because of cancer ... There is someone here who counts the number of
deceased residents and in the last two to three years 100-200 people have died, all
because of the factories. (Resident A in Neighbourhood No.57, August 2016)
Residents also complain about the gradual loss of basic public amenities due to
the decline of the local population’s spending power. Since Lingang’s initiation,
many residents who could afford it have already left the neighbourhood and
other nearby settlements were also gradually relocated, leaving only Neighbour-
hood No.57 behind. The resulting decline of public services often forced residents
to travel for long hours in order to access basic facilities:
Back then this place was very good, we had schools, hospitals, banks and post ofﬁces.
Now there is nothing left, only the residents ... There are no hospitals or schools here.
There is not even a bank here. The elderly people here are really suffering. In order to
get cash from the bank, they need to go to the nearby town and [one time] on their
way back, they were robbed. (Resident B in Neighbourhood No.57, August 2016)
Over the years, a small group of resident representatives have continued to
complain to the township government’s petition ofﬁce and on one occasion the
leader of the township government also visited the affected neighbourhood and
personally promised to look for a quick solution. However, according to local resi-
dents, this dispute has been going on for more than a decade. Despite the many
promises made, the SODC in charge of the industrial area where Neighbourhood
No.57 is located, only came up with a proposal to resolve this issue in 2016. The
largest reason for this sudden responsiveness is because only in 2016 residents
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have started to threaten the township government with a large-scale public peti-
tion, where more than 400 elderly residents would surround the buildings of the
township government, the LDMC and the relevant SODC (Interview with resident
D in Neighbourhood No.57, August 2016). Upon this threat, the LDMC swiftly
requested the relevant SODC to come up with a solution. After two months, the
SODC proposed to develop a new relocation neighbourhood close to other exist-
ing relocation settlements. Unlike conventional relocation, however, the SODC
would only allow affected residents to exchange their existing property with one
relocation property without any further compensation. Furthermore, properties in
Neighbourhood No.57 would not be demolished as many of them are still being
used as private dormitories for the migrants working in nearby factories. Residents
and the leader of the residential committee of Neighbourhood No.57 welcomed
this proposal and the LDMC even identiﬁed the piece of land where the new relo-
cation settlements will be built. However, the hard won progress was halted when
the municipal government rejected the proposal (Interview with resident A in
Neighbourhood No.57, August 2016). Due to the intervention of the municipal
government, the LDMC and the SODC now plan to provide monetary compensa-
tion to affected residents but according to residents there are no concrete plans
of when and how much should be compensated.
In-Situ Marginalisation Under State Entrepreneurialism
There are two important questions arising from the case of Neighbourhood
No.57. Firstly, what has led to the emergence of places such as Neighbourhood
No.57 in Lingang, and secondly why have these problems persisted for so many
years despite continued complaints and petitions by affected residents? We
believe that the core cause lies with the Shanghai municipality, which has priori-
tised the central government’s and its own strategic and political objectives over
the welfare of Lingang residents. The development of Lingang was motivated by
two major factors. In year 2000, Lingang was conceived as a harbour city with
the speciﬁc objective of supporting China’s ﬁrst deep-water harbour on Yangshan
Island, which would compete against other Asian cities with deep-water harbours
such as Pusan and Singapore (Interview with a former senior LDMC ofﬁcial,
August 2016). The harbour city would provide supporting infrastructure to Yang-
shan, including commercial services, housing and functions such as the transfer
from cargo freight to road transport (LDMC 2005). Initially in the ﬁrst round of
the masterplan, Lingang was conceived as a harbour city of around 200,000 resi-
dents and a size of 50–60 km2, which would largely stem from land reclamation
(Interview with former senior Lingang ofﬁcial, August 2016). However, before the
masterplan of Lingang was formalised, the size of Lingang was further expanded
to 315 km2 as the development coincided with Shanghai municipality’s strategy
to upgrade its industrial sector. By the end of the 1990s, the Shanghai municipal-
ity had realised that the city was in need of a new strategic vision for its increas-
ingly stagnating industrial sector and in light of growing competition from other
Chinese cities such as Kunshan or Suzhou. Following several rounds of consulta-
tions with international ﬁrms including McKinsey, AT Kearney and Nomura
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Research Institute, the Shanghai municipality decided to focus on the develop-
ment of the heavy equipment manufacturing industry, which required a lot of
land (SDRC 2003). The decision was made to locate the heavy equipment manu-
facturing industry to Lingang as it still had abundant and cheap land for develop-
ment (Interview with former senior LDMC ofﬁcial, August 2016). Some of
Shanghai’s existing industries, which were faring quite well but in need of more
land to expand, such as the car-manufacturing industry, were also located to Lin-
gang (LDMC 2005). To realise these two key strategic objectives, the Shanghai
municipality used several methods that are representative of state entrepreneurial-
ism. The following sections will elaborate on these methods and how they have
resulted in in-situ marginalisation in places such as Neighbourhood No.57.
Land Financing and the Growing Irrelevance of Indigenous
Residents in Lingang
To realise the two strategic objectives, like most of China’s mega projects, Lin-
gang’s SODCs made use of the land ﬁnancing model to fund the initial relocation
of residents and the development of the industrial zone (Interview with senior Lin-
gang Group ofﬁcial, June 2016). The Lingang Group had to ﬁrst relocate large
numbers of residents in the industrial zone in order to fund the development of
basic infrastructure and factory units for the heavy equipment-manufacturing
zone. An internal document reveals that in Lingang around 64,000 rural residents
(around 21,000 households) have been relocated by 2012 (Lingang internal doc-
ument 2012). To remove any potential conﬂicts with residents arising from poor
compensation, the SODCs focused a lot of their resources on developing reloca-
tion properties. By 2012 around 4 million m2 of relocation properties were con-
structed compared with 1 million m2 of housing units sold at market price. In
Lingang, relocation properties were constructed along with a series of new public
amenities, including schools, libraries and community centres as well as two major
shopping malls, all located in the industrial zone of Lingang (Lingang internal
document 2012). Relocated residents were allocated housing in the same town-
ship, often only a few kilometres away from their original home (Interviews with
relocated residents, June and August 2016). Relocated residents were entitled to
relocation properties, which are calculated based on 40 m2 per person, although
households with only one child would receive an additional 40 m2. For example,
a household consisting of two parents and a child (including those over the age
of 18 but still registered with their hukou in the same household) would receive a
total of 160 m2. The household could choose to buy one large property of 160
m2 or purchase more than one property with sizes ranging between 100 and 60
m2. In many cases, rural residents opt for two properties, one for their own
accommodation and the other one either for their children or for renting out
(Interviews with relocated residents, June 2016). Resident opinions are mixed,
with some residents stating that their income has increased post relocation whilst
others complain about rising living costs and lack of employment for local resi-
dents (Interviews with relocated residents, June 2016). According to Lingang ofﬁ-
cials, there was no major local resistance or conﬂicts and 90% of residents were
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satisﬁed with the relocation, although ofﬁcials also admitted that there were some
cases of conﬂicts with residents who refused to be relocated (Interviews with
township, LDMC and Lingang Group ofﬁcials, June 2016).
In contrast to those who have been relocated, the relationship between the Lin-
gang authorities and residents who have not been relocated is much more con-
ﬂict laden, as exempliﬁed by Neighbourhood No.57. Yet, Neighbourhood No.57
is not a unique case in Lingang and there are several more farms suffering from
similar problems according to residents (Interview with resident C, Neighbour-
hood No.57, August 2016). Recent population numbers by an internal govern-
ment report seem to support this claim as the most built up township located in
the industrial zone still has more than 20,000 residents who have not been relo-
cated (Internal government report 2017).
However, Lingang, having completed the basic infrastructure of the heavy
equipment manufacturing zone, no longer needs to relocate residents on a large
scale. Since the completion of the early phases of land-intensive developments of
Lingang, residents would only be relocated if investment for a speciﬁc project has
been secured:
In terms of the overall relocation policies, there have also been some changes. Back then,
you were basically allowed to relocate residents on a large scale. All you needed was to
show your masterplan and say that the land has been designated for urban develop-
ment. But now you have to have a speciﬁc project ﬁrst in order to get permission to relo-
cate residents. This actually makes a lot of sense in terms of being effective. At the early
stage of development, you need a lot of land in order to construct the entire basic infras-
tructure, but now this is not necessary so the change of relocation policy is not a big
problem [for us]. (Interview with a senior Lingang Group ofﬁcial, September 2015)
Instead, the LDMC and Lingang Group are now shifting their focus towards
attracting high-skilled “talented” workers to the new town as part of their strat-
egy to upgrade Lingang’s industrial zones to a high-tech manufacturing cluster.
Strategies to attract highly skilled workers to Lingang include the provision of sub-
sidised housing, tax relief, the prospect of gaining a Shanghai hukou and a range
of other beneﬁts (Shanghai Municipal Government 2016). Given these changes in
Lingang’s strategic focus, indigenous residents in places like Neighbourhood
No.57 have lost their relevance to the project and will only be relocated if any
speciﬁc new projects require their land.
The Creation of Project-Oriented State Organisations in
Lingang
Before the initiation of the project, it was the district and township governments
that were in charge of urban development and the social governance of the areas
that would later become Lingang (see Figure 3). Township governments were
responsible for local residents as well as the urban development of their townships
and they were governed by Nanhui district government. However, in order to
ensure the successful development of Lingang, the municipality decided to create
two types of new state organisations to take charge of urban development of
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Lingang (Figure 3). The municipality took away the power of planning Lingang
from the township and district governments and gave it to these two new organi-
sations, which were directly governed by the municipality. The ﬁrst new state
organisation is the LDMC, which was introduced to Lingang as the new govern-
ment authority responsible for implementing the masterplan of Lingang. The
LDMC took over the district and township governments’ responsibilities of urban
development and managing the budget of Lingang’s development, as well as the
rights to issue various forms of permissions including building and planning per-
missions (Shanghai Municipal Government 2003). Secondly, SODCs were para-
chuted into Lingang. SODCs took on the role of the main developer of Lingang
and included tasks of coming up with speciﬁc development proposals, ﬁnancing
the projects and attracting new investors. Initially, two SODCs were created for
Figure 3: Changing governance structure before and after Lingang New Town
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Lingang, namely the Shanghai Lingang Economic Development (Group) Co., Ltd
(in short Lingang Group) responsible for developing the industrial zone and the
Harbour City Group responsible for Nanhui main town. Government ofﬁcials who
have a rich experience in delivering important development projects for the
municipality have specially been assigned to lead both these new state organisa-
tions. The district government of Nanhui (annexed into Pudong district since
2008) and its township governments were excluded from the planning and devel-
opment of Lingang. The reason is because Nanhui district government and its
township governments were regarded by the municipality as lacking in urban
development experience and thus incapable of developing a project of such
importance (Interview with former senior planner at LDMC, August 2016).
A further measure taken to ensure the effective development of Lingang was to
put the township governments in charge of the social management and social
governance of the Lingang population. Nanhui district government was responsi-
ble for allocating the budget to the township governments to fund the social
management and social governance of Lingang. Social management in this case
includes the responsibility to provide public services such as health care and waste
management. Social governance involves the relocation of residents, the demoli-
tion of existing neighbourhoods and dealing with the requests and complaints of
local residents. Township governments have to visit and convince affected resi-
dents, whilst the SODCs, as the main developers of Lingang, would pay for the
cost of relocation (Shanghai Municipal Government 2003).
The most important reason for the relegation of social duties to the district and
township governments was to allow the LDMC to focus all its energy on develop-
ing Lingang. Due to this relegation, the development of Lingang, especially in the
early years, was highly efﬁcient as it was planned and managed only by a handful
of ofﬁcials who were directly managed by the municipality:
In the ﬁrst ﬁve or six years, there were very few people [in Lingang], it was a very efﬁ-
cient team, everyone working in Lingang. Our collaboration with the development
corporations was very good, the ones developing Lingang and the ones managing
the development are in the same family. If there is anything then we could discuss it
and come to an agreement ... most issues would be solved in a few days. (Interview
with a former senior planner at the LDMC, August 2016)
However, this institutional arrangement had some major caveats. Firstly, the LDMC,
the SODCs and the municipality paid little attention to the livelihood of residents
when devising the masterplan for Lingang due to their strong focus on the strategic
aspects of Lingang. This is reﬂected in the way the LDMC deﬁnes its own duties:
“Our purpose is very simple, namely to coordinate and plan developments, coordi-
nating the ﬁnancing, and coordinating large projects, that is it. Other smaller issues
we give them to the township governments” (Interview with a senior LDMC ofﬁcer,
August 2016). Consequently, existing Five-Year Plans of Lingang made no mention
of how to improve the livelihood of residents, the provision of employment to
those who have lost their farmland or how to support residents living in the indus-
trial zone suffering the decline of environmental quality and public services (LDMC
2005, 2012, 2016). The prioritisation of strategic objectives over the needs and
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livelihood of local residents during the plan-making process of Lingang was also
clearly felt by residents of Neighbourhood No.57: “You will not ﬁnd any residents
on the urban plans of the municipal government. According to them this place is
just the industrial zone now and this neighbourhood has already vanished” (Resi-
dent C in Neighbourhood No.57, August 2016).
Devolvement of Social Responsibilities to Lower-Tier
Governments
The relegation of social governance responsibilities to the district and township
governments has also led to internal tensions, which largely originate from the
unequal distribution of development beneﬁts and social responsibilities. On the one
hand, the ofﬁcial municipal decree on the governance of Lingang does not require
the LDMC and SODCs to solve any problems of the local population (Shanghai
municipal government 2003, 2013). In other words, there is no legal obligation for
the LDMC and the SODCs to respond to complaints by local residents. Especially
for the SODCs there was a lot of unwillingness to solve local problems due to the
high costs involved. For example, the case of Neighbourhood No.57 would require
the SODC to pay 2.6 billion Yuan, which is a major challenge for the LDMC and
the relevant SODC (Senior ofﬁcial at the SODC responsible for Neighbourhood
No.57, June 2016). Coupled with the fact that the land of Neighbourhood No.57
has not been identiﬁed for any new business investments, it would mean that the
SODC would have to shoulder the cost on its own. However, our research also sug-
gests that the SODC, responsible for the industrial zone where Neighbourhood
No.57 is located, is a company registered on the Chinese stock market with total
assets over 80 billion Yuan. In this sense, we believe that whilst the relocation cost
is a heavy burden for the SODC, it is nonetheless ﬁnancially feasible. A more plausi-
ble reason may be because the performance of SODCs in Lingang is measured by
whether they are able to generate GDP growth (Senior planner at Lingang Group,
June 2016) and not by their ability to resolve local social problems.
On the other hand, the township governments and the district government are
obliged to address local problems but do not have the economic power to do so
as they only receive a fraction of Lingang’s tax income whilst also giving up large
parts of their land:
In order to support the development of Lingang, the heavy equipment manufacturing
zone has for instance taken up more than 20 km2 of land from the Nicheng township.
In terms of administrative responsibilities, they all belong to the township government
but in terms of the tax income for all the businesses that have settled here, that
income belongs to the industrial zone and therefore belongs to the Lingang Group.
So, although these businesses and industries are situated in the administrative area of
this township, the taxes they pay do not belong to us. The businesses also take up
many local resources such as land, water, electricity, but mainly land. (Nicheng town-
ship ofﬁcer, November 2016)
According to the township ofﬁcer, the total size of Nicheng is around 60 km2
whereby the SODCs have taken up half of the land (around 20 km2 for the
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industrial zone and 10 km2 for the logistics zone). In addition, the township also
had to provide around 8 km2 land for the development of relocation settlements
for displaced residents. Despite the large amount of land the townships had to
give up for the Lingang project, they received little of the tax income and there-
fore had little resources to carry out their own developments or respond to local
problems. The SODCs, who receive most of the tax, would only bring small bene-
ﬁts for the township and its residents:
The maximum they [the SODCs] do is to maybe solve a few issues of employment
and also maybe improve the whole image of our area a little. But if you ask me how
much beneﬁt we the local government and the local people have received then I
think this issue is still up for debate. (Nicheng township ofﬁcer, November 2016)
The negative impact of Lingang’s institutional arrangement became particularly
apparent when in 2009 Lingang’s original district government of Nanhui was
annexed to the Pudong New District government. Although it is unclear whether
Lingang was a major reason for the annexation of Nanhui, it was clear that the
municipality hoped for Pudong district to help attract more residents to Lingang’s
main town with their more advanced development expertise and rich ﬁnancial
resources (Xiong 2013). For Pudong district, however, Lingang brought more
responsibilities than beneﬁts and Pudong’s willingness to invest into Lingang and to
solve local problems was limited. The fact that the LDMC and the Lingang Group,
two of Lingang’s most powerful state organisations, remained under the direct
administration of the municipality (Shanghai Municipal Government 2013) meant
that Pudong did not have free reign over Lingang and was in the same disadvan-
taged position as its predecessor. Consequently, there is little cooperation between
all the state organisations and governments in Lingang because they have different
interests and are keen to externalise any responsibilities. A township ofﬁcer explains
this complicated situation from the township government’s viewpoint:
Basically it is like we have two fathers. One father is the Pudong New District govern-
ment and the other father is LDMC ... From Pudong New District’s viewpoint, Lingang
is not even their biological son, it is an area directly managed by the municipality ... The
government is also an economic man (homo economicus, jingji ren), so Pudong thinks
that they still have so many other towns and places that need to be developed so they
do not necessarily have to invest into Lingang ... Pudong thinks that we [the Lingang
townships] have the LDMC as our other father who can take care of us. So, if we have
any requests or problems, with the help of LDMC we can place our requests directly to
the municipal government. Also, the LDMC and Pudong District ... they are not direct
relatives ... so there will be a natural difference in terms of their priorities, interests and
responsibilities. (Interview with township ofﬁcer, November 2016)
The township ofﬁcer further explains that ofﬁcially Lingang is enjoying the sup-
port from both the municipality and district government but in reality nobody is
willing to provide substantial investment into the area especially for solving the
problems of local residents:
Being governed by multiple agencies will have an impact on the progress of some
issues especially in terms of social governance. The result is that everyone tries to avoid
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their own duties. The district government does not care, the LDMC does not care, so
in the end nobody cares. Both are thinking that the issues should be taken care of by
the other party and not by themselves ... This is a very difﬁcult situation and we [the
township government] are stuck in the middle of this and both sides do not care
about us. (Interview with township ofﬁcer, November 2016)
For the residents of Neighbourhood No.57 the internal friction between state
organisations means that they struggle to hold the real decision makers account-
able and instead can only complain to the powerless township government:
They kick the responsibility like a ball, back and forth ... whilst we here do not even
know who to talk to anymore. Local residents are fully aware that the township gov-
ernment’s role is mostly liaising. The township government has no rights and cannot
make any decisions. (Resident B in Neighbourhood No.57, August 2016)
Despite this, residents are forced to rely on the township government as ofﬁcially
the LDMC and the SODCs have no obligations to respond to their requests and
have always avoided them:
We went there with a group of people and they locked the door ... if you directly talk
to the development corporation [responsible for Neighbourhood No.57], they will not
care about you. Now we go to the township government and the government will
directly liaise with them and give them pressure. This way is better, only the govern-
ment can control them! (Resident D in Neighbourhood No.57, August 2016)
Conclusion
The relocation of millions of residents and forced evictions have been highlighted by
many studies as major social problems of China’s mega developments (Hsing 2010;
Jiang et al. 2018; Shin 2012; Zhang 2004, 2017). However, through the case of
Neighbourhood No.57, we ﬁnd that the biggest social problem in Lingang is in-situ
marginalisation whereby residents, who have not been relocated, suffer from declin-
ing public services and environmental quality due to nearby industrial activities.
Although relatively under-researched in China, in-situ marginalisation is not limited to
Lingang and other studies have also reported similar problems (He et al. 2009; Shih
2017; Tian et al. 2017). The contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, through the
case of Lingang we provided an in-depth analysis of in-situ marginalisation and its
underlying causes, which so far have remained an under-researched social problem.
The Lingang project was conceived to realise the strategic visions of serving the
Yangshan deep-water port as a harbour city and the industrial base for Shanghai to
upgrade its industrial sector. The project was funded through land ﬁnancing and
early phases of the project involved large-scale residential relocation, although resis-
tance was relatively low due to a fairly generous compensation package. Lingang’s
governance is dominated by the LDMC, which took over the planning and bud-
getary power from the district and township governments, and two major SODCs,
which deliver speciﬁc projects and are the main ﬁnancial benefactor of the project.
Problems of in-situ marginalisation started to emerge upon completion of the basic
infrastructure of the industrial zone, and the land acquisition policy switched from
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large-scale land acquisition to only relocating residents when there is demand for
speciﬁc projects. Having sold its 9.4 km2 of farmland during the early phases of Lin-
gang’s development, Neighbourhood No.57 was only left with its core residential
area of 80 hectares, which mattered little to the development of the industrial zone.
Despite years of continued complaints and petition to the township government,
Neighbourhood No.57 is yet to be relocated. Lingang’s township governments
blame the absence of any strategy for the wellbeing of local residents on the lack of
involvement of the township and district governments during the initial planning of
Lingang. Furthermore, the centralisation of planning power and ﬁnancial beneﬁts to
the LDMC and the SODCs have effectively taken away the ability of the townships to
provide any substantial help to Neighbourhood No.57 residents. The unequal distri-
bution of development and economic powers have also reduced the willingness of
the district government to involve itself in Lingang and help the township solve Lin-
gang’s social problems. The internal tensions created by Lingang’s institutional
arrangement is by no means unique as other Chinese mega projects also have similar
problems (Jiang et al. 2016b; Wu and Phelps 2011).
The second contribution of this study is towards the conceptualisation of state
entrepreneurialism and the distinctive social problems that emerge under this gover-
nance paradigm. Table 1 compares the social outcomes and causes of mega projects
developed under neoliberalism and state entrepreneurialism. Unlike neoliberal mega
projects which focus on proﬁting from land revalorisation and an improved tax basis
(Swyngedouw et al. 2002), state entrepreneurialism stresses the prioritisation of
strategic objectives for Chinese mega projects such as alignment with central govern-
ment policies (Wu 2018:1385). Whilst land revalorisation still plays a crucial role in
China, especially for strategically important mega projects, land ﬁnancing is more a
means to an end than the objective itself. For neoliberal mega projects, displacement
and gentriﬁcation are major problems and are caused by a public–private growth
coalition that is driven by a shared pursuit of land proﬁt (Fainstein 2008; Hiller 1998;
Olds 1998; Watt 2013). Yet in China, the fate of residents is not merely determined
Table 1: Mega projects under neoliberalism and state entrepreneurialism
Neoliberal mega projects
Mega project under state
entrepreneurialism
Project
objectives
Beneﬁting from land value increase
and improvement of tax basis
Fulﬁlling the strategic and political
objectives of the state
Financing
method
Public grants, tax relief and private
funds
State funding through land ﬁnancing
model
Governance Public–private partnerships
dominated by private interests
Governmental and quasi-
governmental state organisations
dominated by project-oriented
state corporations
Social impacts Displacement, gentriﬁcation, post
political society
Mass relocation, forced evictions, in-
situ marginalisation
State’s response
to residents’
contestation
Depoliticising contentious issues and
replacing democratic processes
with superﬁcial technical
consensus
Devolvement of social responsibilities
to low-tier governments; reﬁned
compensation schemes for
“relevant” residents
20 Antipode
ª 2019 The Authors. Antipode published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Antipode Foundation Ltd.
by market logic but even more by how relevant they are to the state’s strategic
objectives whereby those who are not of importance receive very little attention and
compensation. The way the state responds towards public contestation against mega
projects also differs between neoliberal and Chinese mega projects. For neoliberal
projects, to pacify public resistance the state adopts fuzzy concepts aimed at pleasing
everyone and introduces lengthy, elaborate but ultimately superﬁcial planning partici-
pation procedures (Lehrer and Laidley 2008; Swyngedouw 2009; Tarazona Vento
2017). Under state entrepreneurialism, the state foregrounds large public resistance,
through generous compensation packages but only to those residents who are rele-
vant to state, yet makes very little effort to relocate residents once they have been
relocated (Jiang et al. 2018; Kan 2019). The state also devolves its social responsibili-
ties to powerless lower-tier governments to deal with contestations from residents
that are irrelevant to the state’s objectives. Under China’s urban governance model,
though somewhat counterintuitive, relocation may not always be the worst outcome
compared with residents suffering from in-situ marginalisation.
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Endnotes
1 State Owned Development Corporations are all state-owned enterprises but can be man-
aged by different levels of the government. In Lingang, SODCs are owned by the Shanghai
municipal government or the Pudong district government. For example, the Shanghai Lin-
gang Economic Development (Group) Co., Ltd is a SOE but with development functions. It
is therefore not just an “urban investment and development company” as it is also an
industrial group in charge of the industrial zone of Lingang.
2 Relocation properties are housing speciﬁcally built for compensating relocation residents
(Zhang et al. 2018).
3 Work-unit (danwei) housing was developed by enterprises or institutes for the purpose of
housing their own staff members.
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